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Abstract-- In this paper we present a model for analysing the 
strategic behaviour of a generator and its short run implications 
on an electricity network with transmission constraints. The 
problem is formulated as a Stackelberg leader-follower game. The 
upper level problem is generator’s profit maximisation subject to 
the solution of the lower level problem of optimal power flow 
(OPF) solved by system operator. Strategic bidding is modelled as 
an iterative procedure where the supply functions of the competi-
tive fringe are fixed while the strategic player’s bids are changed 
in a successive order until the bid giving maximum profit is 
found. This application rests on the assumption of supply function 
Nash equilibrium when the supplier believes that changes in his 
bids will not influence other actors to alter their bid functions. 
Numerical examples are presented on a simple triangular net-
work. 
 
Index Terms—Electric power market, Supply function equi-
libria, Bilevel games, Strategic energy bidding, Irrelevant con-
straints 
I.  NOMENCLATURE 
Sets: 
N  - set of nodes (buses) 
iK  - set of producers at node i, Ni ∈  
L  - set of links in the network 
lL  - set of directed links within a loop l 
Variables: 
ip  - locational price at node i, Ni ∈ , ),( Nipp i ∈=  
iks  - supply function slope at node i for producer k, Ni ∈ , 
iKk ∈ , ),,( iik KkNiss ∈∈=  
d
iq  - quantity consumed in node i (demand), Ni ∈ , 
),( Niqq di
d ∈=  
s
ikq  - quantity produced in node i by producer k (supply), 
Ni ∈ , iKk ∈ , ),,( i
s
ik
s KkNiqq ∈∈=  
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ijx  - flow over link Lji ∈),( , )),(,( Ljixx ij ∈=  
Parameters: 
n   - number of nodes 
m  - number of links { }ji,  in the network, Nji ∈,  
ia  - inverse demand function intercept at node i, Ni ∈  
ib  - inverse demand function slope at node i, Ni ∈  
ikQ  - production capacity at node i for producer k, Ni ∈ , 
iKk ∈  
ijM  - capacity of link Lji ∈),(  
II.  INTRODUCTION 
IBERALISATION of the electricity industry has been 
underway for the past two decades or more. The process 
of moving from strictly regulated monopolies to functional 
specialisation and competitive markets was justified by chang-
es in technology and the desire for improved efficiency 
through better pricing. Types of liberalisation models vary 
from country to country and there is no overall consensus on 
which one is most appropriate. The more the market is open to 
competition the more important becomes the issue of its design 
that will be robust and efficient. The task of creating an opti-
mal electricity market design is complicated by the technologi-
cal characteristics of the transmission of electric power. We all 
know that the specifics of a power flow restrict us in the ability 
to effectively monitor it, and the storage of energy is too ex-
pensive. These two features contribute to the incompleteness 
of electricity markets together with constraints on transmission 
and weather conditions. Power flows in an electricity network 
obey certain physical laws that give rise to the phenomenon of 
loop flow, when the flow cannot be routed and will take all 
available paths between origin and destination. In transmission 
networks the capacity of transmission lines determines the 
degree of competition between different producers in different 
locations, even though this is not always the case. Congested 
lines may isolate parts of the network from competition thus 
possibly increasing market power for agents with a favourable 
location to the congested line. Producers in liberalised markets 
with transmission constraints may be interested in inducing 
congestion to rip the benefits of being a monopolist in a cer-
tain area. Another possibility for agents in the market to exer-
cise horizontal market power is their size or a high geographic 
concentration. If competition in the market is weak the market 
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may fail to bring prices down to marginal cost. 
The existing literature has many examples of modelling com-
petition in electricity markets to study opportunities for strate-
gic bidding and, as a result, exercise of market power. The 
amount of market power that can be exercised is dependent on 
a number of factors, such as; physical characteristics of the 
network, transmission pricing methods, power mitigating ar-
rangements, and auction design. A summary paper in a tabular 
format [1] describes eight models measuring market power 
applied to different geographic markets. A brief literature sur-
vey of strategic bidding in competitive electricity markets was 
presented in [2]. In [3] authors attempt to identify, classify and 
characterise electricity generation market models that include a 
representation of the physical system and are suited for analys-
ing imperfectly competitive markets. 
Mathematical modelling allows a generalisation of market 
and network structure and participants’ interactions. It produc-
es sensitivity data that can be used for further analyses. A 
number of studies use bilevel games as a model basis for the 
electricity market, see, among others, [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], 
[10]. Similar studies including [4], [7], [5], [11], [9] and [12] 
model supply function bidding on meshed networks with 
transmission constraints. A much larger number of papers ap-
ply supply function bidding for analysis but fail to include 
consideration of transmission constraints and loop flow in the 
network. 
Reference [13] employ a bilevel game to model electricity 
markets with looped networks when generators/consumers bid 
their linear supply/demand functions by modifying a single 
parameter in the function. The findings of the paper employing 
an SFE model contradict some of the results of previous sim-
pler models and intuitive logic, and the authors conclude that 
probably each given situation in the electricity market requires 
its own specific model. 
In [14] authors study a bilevel model of restructured elec-
tricity markets, where each strategic player faces a problem 
formulated as a mathematical program with equilibrium con-
straints (MPEC). The whole game is an example of an equilib-
rium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC). Authors 
demonstrate situations where pure Nash equilibria can be 
found and further study the weaker concepts of local Nash and 
Nash stationary equilibria that can be viewed as solutions to 
complementarity problems. Some numerical examples of 
methods finding Nash stationary points are presented for some 
randomly generated EPECs. 
Reference [15] study the effect of the market pricing mech-
anism (pay-as-bid or marginal pricing) on the profit of strate-
gically bidding supplier (manipulation of the intercept). Stra-
tegic behaviour is formulated as a bilevel problem using a 
supply function equilibrium (SFE) model and a solution is 
found by employing the MPEC approach introduced in [9]. 
The results of numerical simulations show that market clearing 
prices were the same under both pricing mechanisms provided 
there were no transmission constraints. In the presence of 
transmission constraints supplier’s profit was dependent on the 
pricing rule as well as his position on the network. 
In [16] authors model the deregulated electricity market as 
a bilevel mathematical program and demonstrate that this for-
mulation helps reveal the impact of simplifying the electricity 
network and omitting the inclusion of physical constraints. 
In this paper we present a model for analysing the strategic 
behaviour of a generator and its short run implications on an 
electricity network with transmission constraints. The problem 
is formulated as a Stackelberg leader-follower game where the 
leader is the individual bidding strategically (in our case a 
supplier), while the follower is the system operator that choos-
es its strategy while having full knowledge about the leader’s 
decision (but not his true cost/supply curve), a fact that the 
leader also takes into account while making his decisions. The 
rest of the suppliers act as a competitive fringe that take the 
strategy of the bidding suppler (leader) as given, bid their 
marginal cost, act as price takers and achieve a restricted com-
petitive equilibrium. 
Since our model is a bilevel program we will be interested 
to study the effect of irrelevant constraints first discussed by 
[17]. Unlike standard mathematical problems the inclusion of 
an irrelevant constraint into a bilevel program makes the solu-
tion deviate from optimal solution. The consideration of this 
property is important when modelling real world situations as 
a seemingly unimportant constraint that actually would affect 
the optimal solution might be left out. 
The rest of the paper is organised as following. In Section 
III we describe problem structure and introduce the example of 
a simple three-node network. Section IV presents the mathe-
matical model formulation. Section V analyses the numerical 
results on the simple network. In Section VI we conclude and 
outline ideas for further research. 
III.  PROBLEM STRUCTURE AND A SIMPLE NETWORK EXAMPLE 
We study generator bidding strategically in a power net-
work that consists of a number of nodes and edges connecting 
them. There is both production and consumption in every 
node, and edges represent transmission lines. Both generators 
and consumers provide bids that describe their demand and 
supply at various prices on an hourly basis to the system op-
erator. Generators’ bids are represented by linear nondecreas-
ing marginal price functions, and consumers’ bids are repre-
sented as downward sloping curves. The system operator then 
finds optimal nodal prices, and demand and supply quantities 
based on the solution to the OPF model, in order to maximise 
total welfare (sum of generator and consumer surpluses meas-
ured by their bids). Generators can however choose bid func-
tions that do not represent their true costs by manipulating the 
slope of the supply functions seeking to maximise their indi-
vidual profits. 
We provide a simple example of the electric power network 
with three interconnected nodes as in Fig. 1. This triangular 
connection demonstrates the phenomenon of loop flow. In this 
network each node hosts a consumer (demand) and a set of 
producers (supply). 
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Fig. 1.  Simple three-node network. 
 
Specific supply and demand data with capacities is summa-
rised in Table 1. 
TABLE I 
ASSUMPTIONS ON DEMAND AND SUPPLY FUNCTIONS 
 
 
IV.  MODEL 
The model presented is a linearised direct current (DC) 
flow model that assumes full information and linear supply and 
demand functions. We assume that all lines have the same 
electrical characteristics and that small total losses are neglect-
ed. Transmission capacity constraints are the supposed thermal 
capacity levels. So far we only consider a single period (one 
hour) static model. 
From a mathematical perspective our model is formulated 
as a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints 
(MPEC). Strategic bidding is modelled as an iterative proce-
dure where the supply functions of the competitive fringe are 
fixed while the strategic player’s bids are changed in a succes-
sive order until the bid giving maximum profit is found. This 
application rests on the assumption of supply function Nash 
equilibrium when the supplier seeks to maximise his own prof-
it while believing that changes in his bids will not influence 
other actors to alter their bid functions. 
Model formulation is as following: 
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s
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The model above is a two-level optimisation problem, 
where the upper level is individual’s (supplier or consumer) 
profit maximisation subject to the solution of the lower level 
problem of optimal power flow (OPF) solved by system opera-
tor, where optimal generation and load dispatches as well as 
system spot prices are determined while total social welfare is 
maximised assuming the bid supply functions are ‘true’. 
Individual’s profit function (1) is given by 
)10(.)(5,0))(),(),(( 2sikik
s
iki
sd
ik qsqpsqsqsp −=Π
The objective of OPF (2) is a social welfare function where 
total consumer benefit is given by 
∑
∈
+=
Ni
ii
d
i
d paqsqB )(5,0),( , 
and total supplier cost is given by 
∑ ∑
∈ ∈
=
Ni Kk
s
ikik
s
i
qssqC 2)(5,0),( . 
Constraints (3) represent Kirchhoff’s junction rule that in-
sures that net ingoing flows into a node is equal to the sum of 
all outgoing flows. Constraints (4) stand for Kirchhoff’s loop 
rule saying that the sum of voltages in a closed circuit is zero. 
Constraint (5) corresponds to the law of conservation of ener-
gy guaranteeing that total production is equal to total con-
sumption. Constraints in (6) are the inverse demand functions 
for consumers. Constraints (7) guarantee that the price at each 
node is determined by the least cost efficient producer or by 
demand. 
Constraints (8) and (9) represent the transmission link and 
production capacities’ constraints respectively. 
V.  NUMERICAL RESULTS 
We first look at the competitive equilibrium solution when 
all parties act as price takers. So far there is no transmission 
constraint present in the network, the system price is uniform 
at 115.4 units per MWh. The competitive equilibrium price 
exceeds the marginal costs of generators a and b at nodes 1 
and 2. This difference is the scarcity rent due to the limited 
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capacity of these generators, which is not in itself an evidence 
of the exercise of market power. All results are summarised in 
Table II below. 
A couple of interesting changes are observed compared to 
the unconstrained solution when we look at a situation where a 
transmission capacity restriction of 2000 units is presented on 
line 1-3. Prices have fallen for the suppliers at node 1 and 2 
and quantities have decreased for the most efficient producers 
at node 1. At the same time price at node 3 has increased and 
the less efficient producers increase their outputs. Price chang-
es reflect the congestion costs introduced by the constraint. 
Suppliers in node 1 are forced to sell locally and due to the 
inelasticity of the demand the prices are brought down, same 
reasoning explains the rise in the prices at node 3 where local 
producers can increase their output due to the scarcity of sup-
ply from other generators induced by the constraint. Now that 
we have moved away from the unconstrained solution total 
social welfare has decreased by 0.08%. This is only a slight 
decrease but if we look at consumers and producers separately 
we see that in aggregate producers’ surplus is decreased and 
consumers’ surplus increased. And then separately, producers 
at node 3 experiences a positive change in surplus of over 30% 
compared to the competitive solution, while producers at node 
1 experience a negative change of over 40%. In their turn con-
sumers at node 1 benefit slightly, while consumers at node 3 
face a negative surplus change. These income redistribution 
effects give rise to a complicated discussion on whether to 
invest in new transmission capacity, as even though the total 
social surplus increases as a result some parties may find 
themselves being worse off. These results are summarised in 
the first two columns of Table III. 
Finally we look at the situation where one of the suppliers 
will bid strategically. We choose supplier a at node 1 to be the 
strategic player. Equilibrium is found through a complete 
enumeration procedure where the slope of the supply function 
of the strategically bidding supplier is allowed to vary with an 
increment of 0.0025 from 0 to 1, while his profit is maximised. 
The system settles at a uniform price of 144.9 units per MWh. 
The efficient generator 1a manages to increase the system 
price by withholding its production at the same time as other 
generators do not have enough capacity to offset this decrease. 
Total supply of energy is decreased with ca 1%, and this slight 
change draws the price from 115.4 to 144.9 due to the inelastic 
demand. 
Next, we test the importance of inclusion of irrelevant con-
straints into our bilevel model. As pointed in [17], when an 
additional inactive constraint is included in the bilevel pro-
gram, the original solution may no longer be optimal. We take 
the same situation as above, where producer in 1a bids strate-
gically, and add a capacity constraint of 210 units on link 1-2 
that seemingly should not disturb our optimal solution from the 
previous example. However, the solution has changed as we 
can see from results in Table II, the new constraint becomes 
binding although for the flow going from node 2 to 1. The 
price is no longer uniform across the network, with the highest 
being in node 1 of 205.05 units per MWh, as the total supply 
in node 1 decreased from 10855.95 to 10242.11 units. Our 
strategic bidder has under current conditions picked a different 
slope of his supply function (0.0425 compared to 0.0225 in 
previous example) and is now earning more (20.3% increase) 
by producing less (25.1% decrease). Total social welfare has 
decreased by 0.84%. 
As discussed previously by [16], in bilevel programs based 
on problems arising in electricity networks loop flow con-
straints cannot be omitted, which might happen if one for ex-
ample relies on the analogy with transportation networks, 
where the flow can be routed. The solution of a bilevel prob-
lem is then influenced by this misunderstanding in the same 
way as if one of the necessary conditions of the lower level 
problem was not taken into account. We introduce two addi-
tional constraints to our model: on link 1-2 constraint of 400, 
and on link 2-3 a constraint of 1000. 
 
TABLE II 
NUMERICAL RESULTS
  Unconstrained 
solution 
Constrained 
solution  
(C13 = 2000) 
Strategic bidder 1a 
(C13 = 2000) 
Irrelevant constraint  
(C13 = 2000, C12 = 
210) 
No account of loop flow, stra-
tegic bidder 1a, (C12 = 400, C13 
= 2000, C23 = 1000) 
Price p1 115.4 87.17 144.92 205.05 223.64 
 p2 115.4 109.70 144.92 99.32 95.51 
 p3 115.4 132.22 144.92 152.18 183.16 
Welfare Total 36218077 36187612 36082570 35866064 35623964 
 Producer 1547219 1297070 2117949 2444754 2731534 
 Consumer 34670858 34755411 33964620 33421310 32892430 
Production Node 1 9615.38 9709.42 9516.95 9316.51 9254.55 
 Node 2 2403.85 2408.59 2379.24 2417.23 2420.41 
 Node 3 12019.2 11949.1 11896.2 11865.9 11736.8 
Consumption Node 1 12923.08 11913.71 10855.95 10242.11 9454.54 
 Node 2 4000.00 4000.00 4000.00 3972.84 3820.4 
 Node 3 7115.38 8153.39 8936.43 9384.70 10136.84 
Profit Bidder 1a 633462 379961 725944 872897 764091 
Flow 1-2 570.51 204.29 -93.92 -210 -400 
 2-3 2166.67 1795.72 1526.84 1345.6 600 
 1-3 2737.18 2000.00 1432.92 1135.6 1000 
 
Numerical results show how the solution changes when the 
loop flow constraint is dropped. Total social welfare has in-
creased in the last case compared to the situation with a strate-
gic bidder 1a and constraint of 2000 on 1-2 line by 1,2%. Pro-
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ducers and consumers at node 2 have not been affected as a 
result of dropped loop flow constraint, their prices and quanti-
ties remain the same, and so are the flows from node 2 to 
nodes 1 and 3 which utilise all the capacity available. At the 
same time the flow on route 1-3 has increased more than three 
times as a result of the change in the model, prices at both 
nodes have settled at 146.61 units per MWh. While producers 
at node 1 have increased their production, overall production 
at node 3 has dropped. Our strategic bidder 1a produces 75% 
more in the new case than in the original one while his profits 
have gone down by 2.8%. 
In Fig. 2 we show how the profit function of strategically 
bidding producer develops in a constrained problem and after 
the inclusion of the irrelevant constraint. We see that the profit 
function in constrained solution (C13 = 2000) has a local max-
ima, which shifts upwards and becomes the new solution once 
we have introduced the irrelevant constraint C12 = 210. 
 
Fig. 2.  Profit of supplier in 1a. 
 
TABLE III 
INCOME REDISTRIBUTION EFFECTS 
 
Surplus Unconstrained 
solution 
Constrained 
solution 
Strategic bidder 1a 
Grid reve-
nue 
0 135131 0 
Consumers 34670858 34755411 33964620 
Node 1 13868343 14140930 13585848 
Node 2 3467985 3480775 3396462 
Node 3 17335428 17133706 16982310 
Producers 1547219 1297070 2117949 
Node 1 875178 519280 1090775 
Node 2 261538 238781 379661 
Node 3 410503 539009 647513 
Total 36218077 36187612 36082570 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Our results show that a strategically bidding generator may 
reduce its production leading to an optimal dispatch in the 
network without binding transmission constraints, making the 
prices equal in the network. A generator may be able to in-
crease its profits in the presence of transmission constraint(s), 
even though this might not lead to separating parts of the mar-
ket. Another finding is that seemingly irrelevant constraints 
may change the equilibrium solution in a system with imper-
fect competition. On the other hand, introducing a tighter ca-
pacity constraint does not always result in a decrease in total 
surplus. 
Our future research is to study the case of a strategically 
bidding generator owning capacity in several different nodes. 
Another case is to study the effect of size of a generator on the 
amount of market power it can exercise. A natural progression 
would be to model and analyse coordinated bidding of several 
generators with an EPEC model. 
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